By Friederike Richter, researcher at the Chair
Diversification of defence cooperation since 1991
Since the end of the Cold War, an increasing number of defence cooperation agreements in Europe have emerged outside the multilateral framework. These partnerships take a variety of forms. They may be temporary or permanent, institutionalised or not, conducted in pairs or in small groups. In the literature, various terms are used to designate them: agreements, friendships, couples, understandings, (strategic) partnerships, privileged relations, etc. The use of these terms often reflects the fact that they are not necessarily the same thing. The use of these terms often reflects the diplomatic conditions in which these agreements came into being, as well as the terminology typical of the period. [1]. The diversification of cooperation methods observed in Europe since 1991 can be explained in part by the different objectives that these partnerships are trying to achieve: if the aim is to gain legitimacy, the cooperation process must be open to a large number of European partners and comply with international standards ; if the aim is to improve efficiency, the focus is on achieving the objectives set by the small group of development workers.
In the literature, particularly in the social sciences, there has been a recent interest in the articulation of these different types and formats of cooperation. Camille Morel and Friederike Richter propose a typology of defence cooperation in the 21st century.e century, classifying agreements according to their level of cooperation (bi-, mini- or multilateral), their objectives (specific or general), their duration (temporary or permanent), their field (operation or investment) and their framework (institutionalised or not). [2]. They show the nuances that exist between these different models of cooperation and stress the fact that a state will not opt for a single format in a firm and definitive manner, but will instead articulate these different types of cooperation according to its interests on the international scene. A similar argument is put forward by Samuel B. H. Faure, who examines French arms policy. France mobilises «different types of international cooperation to respond to a public problem».» [3], This approach, which he calls «flexilateralism», aims above all to increase efficiency by simultaneously using different modes of cooperation..
Different types of cooperation, different benefits
Each type of cooperation has its own costs and benefits. The advantages and disadvantages of the different forms of cooperation are relatively well known, particularly in the case of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, which were the two main forms of cooperation in the 20th century.
Multilateralism, as it is currently understood, dates back to the mid-19th century and developed mainly between the wars, with a proliferation of international organisations since 1945. It is a process of cooperation between more than two States, involving a certain form of institutionalisation. Thanks to its underlying principles - non-discrimination, indivisibility and reciprocity [4] - Multilateralism is seen as an appropriate form of cooperation for managing certain common security challenges, with the support of the international community. A number of advantages - of different kinds - have been identified in the literature: political advantages, because multilateralism makes it possible, among other things, to legitimise military action; strategic advantages, because cooperation on an international scale is likely to increase the level of security worldwide; operational advantages, because multilateralism is intended to strengthen the interoperability of armed forces and their equipment in the medium and long term; and finally economic advantages, because this mode of cooperation makes it possible to achieve economies of scale and therefore to share the burden.
Despite its many assets, multilateralism seems to be going through a critical period [5], This is currently illustrated by the lack of unity in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic.. The reasons for this fatigue are numerous and include institutional slowness, leading to high decision-making and coordination costs; uniformity of decision-making in the face of often heterogeneous preferences and needs; and dilution of responsibilities between partners, which can lead to opportunism and "double standards". free-riding. Multilateral cooperation can therefore be counter-productive. This is why, since the end of the Cold War, we have seen the formation of more flexible and less institutionalised partnerships, sometimes in a restricted format [6]. These appear to be more effective and better adapted to the current security challenges. [7].
Established within the framework of existing partnerships or set up outside any multilateral agreement, these ‘new’ modes of cooperation aim for greater efficiency in the decision-making process, and therefore also in the end result. Unlike bilateralism, which is the restricted form of cooperation par excellence, these partnerships are not necessarily institutionalised and are therefore particularly flexible. They can be adapted on a case-by-case basis, whether in terms of the choice of partners or the objective and duration of the partnership. The effectiveness of this type of cooperation results above all from greater freedom of action and a non-negligible reduction in decision-making and coordination costs., particularly in relation to multilateral cooperation [8].
This trend towards more diverse forms of cooperation - accompanied by an increase in the number of more informal, smaller-format agreements - is not without its drawbacks, however. Firstly, such cooperation may seem less legitimate because they do not have the backing of the international community. Secondly, they make international relations less predictable, in particular because there are some uncertainty about their long-term viability.
Each cooperating state must find an interest and a meaning in cooperation, not only in the short but also in the long term: in choosing the partnership format, it is therefore mainly a question of finding - and maintaining - the right balance between its strategic autonomy, the legitimacy of its collaborative action and the effectiveness of the defence policy it is putting in place. [9].
France and its European partners: cooperating, but with whom and how?
Since the end of the Cold War, cooperation has become a reality for the French armed forces. France has begun to develop a «flexilateral» approach to its defence policy, contributing to numerous arrangements with one or more partners. Some are based on dedicated institutions - within or outside a multilateral framework - while others are more informal, or even more ad hoc. In the case of France, this has been particularly true over the last ten years.
Paris is a co-founder of several multilateral organisations and alliances, including the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Multilateralism was France's preferred format for defence cooperation until the 2000s, particularly for external operations, this approach began to change with the 2008 White Paper on foreign policy. He argues that the country needs to opt for more pragmatic and flexible partnerships. [10]. This is also true within the EU, which is France's main vector of influence in the field of foreign policy.
Although the 2008 and 2013 White Papers on defence and national security re-emphasised that a European defence White Paper seemed, in the long term, natural [11], a growing number of bi- and minilateral cooperation projects have been set up over the last five years. For example, the European Intervention Initiative (EII) aims to create a core group of states to prepare and coordinate joint operations. The 2017 Strategic Review stresses that France «supports the optimal combination of different cooperation formats».» [12] at European level, giving priority to partners with the political will and military capability to assume their responsibilities on the international stage. This is reflected in the maintenance of privileged bilateral relations on the one hand, and the establishment of minilateral cooperation on the other.
Bilaterally, France cooperates closely with Germany and the United Kingdom on operational, capability and industrial issues. Franco-British cooperation increased sharply after the Cold War [13], It led to the signing of the Lancaster House Treaties in 2010 under Nicolas Sarkozy. This led to the signing of the Lancaster House Treaties in 2010, under Nicolas Sarkozy, who gave greater priority to the Franco-British partnership than to the Franco-German partnership during his term of office. [14]. The special relationship between France and Germany has, in turn, become a key driver of defence cooperation in Europe in recent years, particularly since the UK's decision to leave the EU and the signing of the Aachen Treaty. [15]. France also maintains close relations with Belgium, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden, including on industrial issues. These bilateral agreements are intended to be opened up to other EU members - for example within the framework of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC), a mechanism designed to develop collaboration between Member States - while emphasising the co-development of military capabilities. [16].
France supplements its bilateral relations at European level with the help of small-group cooperation, which is either informal (such as the Weimar Triangle or the Normandy Format) either formal (such as the development of the helicopter NH-90, France has therefore begun to focus on effective multilateral action. In line with the European Security Strategy of 2003, France has therefore begun to aim for effective multilateral action, notably by reducing the number of cooperating partners. [17]. It has moved from a «global» multilateralism to a more European multilateralism, and even to a minilateralism within the EU.
Conclusion
Since the end of the Cold War, defence cooperation, which has become a reality for the French armed forces (France participates in 2/3 of PSC projects, for example), has become much more diversified. While France has continued to cooperate on a multilateral level - notably via the UN, NATO and the EU - it has maintained and strengthened its privileged bilateral relations, notably with Germany and the United Kingdom. It has also opted for more pragmatic agreements, giving priority to European partners with the political will and military capacity to assume their role on the international stage. France has also become more involved in industrial cooperation, often at a minilateral level. It is therefore considering the optimal combination of different cooperation formats at European level, taking into account the advantages and disadvantages of each type of cooperation.
Since 2016, there has been a proliferation of initiatives launched at European level to maximise the benefits - particularly the economic benefits - of defence cooperation: In particular, a Global Strategy seeking to improve the effectiveness of EU Member States' defence, a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) for non-executive mandate operations, the PSC, the IEI or even a European Defence Fund to improve the EU's competitiveness and strategic (industrial) autonomy have seen the light of day... France's role in setting up these initiatives is not negligible. However, none of this cooperation can be detached from the political and economic context in which it takes place. Although defence cooperation has once again become an important political issue since 2016, at both national and European level, the Covid-19 pandemic - and the economic crisis it has triggered - risk putting an end to this momentum, by making defence a real adjustment variable within EU Member States, and thus putting the brakes on recently launched initiatives.
[1] Olivier Schmitt, «Alliances (coalitions)» in Benoît Durieux, Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer and Frédéric Ramel (eds.), Dictionary of war and peace, Paris, PUF, 2017, p. 56-64.
[2] Camille Morel and Friederike Richter, «Legitimate or effective? The dilemma of defence cooperation in the 21st century», The Champs de Mars, n°32, 2019, p. 7-28.
[3] Samuel B. H. Faure, «La politique du «flexilatéralisme»: le cas de la politique française d'armement dans le contexte du Brexit», The Champs de Mars, n°30, 2018, p. 73-101, p. 75.
[4] John Gerard Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 11.
[5] Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, «La chute de l'ordre international libéral?, Spirit, n°6, 2017, p. 98-112; Jean-Marie Guéhenno, «La crise du multilatéralisme, Spirit, no. 8, 2014, pp. 49-57; Edward Newman. A Crisis of Global Institutions? Multilateralism and International Security, London, Routledge, 2007; Philippe Moreau Desfarges, «Le multilatéralisme et la fin de l'Histoire», Foreign policy, n°69, 2004, p. 575-586.
[6] Luk Van Langenhove, «The Transformation of Multilateralism Mode 1.0 to Mode 2.0, Global Policy, n°3, 1, 2010, p. 263-270.
[7] Erica Morel, «Effective minilateralism for the EU. What, When and How». Brief Issue, European Union Institute for Security Studies, no. 17, 2016.
[8] David M. Malone and Yuen F. Khong, Unilateralism and U.S. foreign policy: International perspectives, Boulder, Co, Lynne Rienner, 2003.
[9] Camille Morel and Friederike Richter, «Legitimate or effective? The dilemma of defence cooperation in the 21st century», The Champs de Mars, n°32, 2019, p. 7-28.
[10] Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, «France and Europe in the World: White Paper on France's Foreign and European Policy (2008-2020)», Paris, La Documentation française, 2008.
[11] Ministry of Defence, «Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale», Paris, Direction de l'information légale et administrative, 2013; Ministry of Defence, «Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale», Paris, La Documentation française, 2008.
[12] Ministry of the Armed Forces, «Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale», Paris, Délégation à l'information et à la communication de la défense, 2017, p. 63.
[13] Alice Pannier, Rivals in Arms: The Rise of UK-France Defence Relations in the Twenty-First Century, Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press, 2020.
[14] Maxime Lefebvre, France's foreign policy, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2019.
[15] Delphine Deschaux-Dutard, «Franco-German military cooperation and European defence after the Brexit», The Champs de Mars, n°32, 2019, p. 52-76.
[16] Ministry of Defence, «Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale. Paris, Délégation à l'information et à la communication de la défense», 2017; Ministry of the Armed Forces, «Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale», Paris, Direction de l'information légale et administrative, 2013.
[17] Josselin Droff and Julien Malizard, «Menaces, biens publics et demande de défense européenne», National Defence Review, No. 3, 2020, pp. 95-100.
