Maxime Menuet joins the Economics of Defence - IHEDN Chair team as an Associate Researcher.
After a bachelor's degree and two master's degrees (in macroeconomics/finance and applied mathematics) at University of Orléans, Maxime Menuet defended a thesis in economics in May 2018, entitled« Public debt, political equilibrium and aggregate instability » under the direction of Professor Patrick Villieu. This thesis was awarded the Banque de France Foundation prize (2019).
Maxime is currently Senior Lecturer at the University of Orléans. His current research focuses on theoretical macroeconomics, the economics of conflict and defence, and the history of economic thought, and has led him to publish in international journals (Economic Theory, Annals of Economics and Statistics, The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought,…).
He has also taken part in numerous conferences and organised two scientific events on the subject of conflict and defence, one of which, held in 2018 at the École Militaire, focused on the First World War.
Recent publications by Maxime Menuet on the economics of defence and conflict:
- «How do you put an end to a war of attrition? Some lessons from theoretical models».», National Defence Review, 832, 125-130, Summer 2020.
The theoretical models based on games can provide valuable insights into the mechanisms specific to wars of attrition. It is still very difficult to estimate the likely duration, which is why it is even more important to have a clear idea of how long it is likely to last. information to reduce uncertainties and draw conclusions to put an end to the conflict.
- «Should we destroy the enemies of our adversaries? The need for enemies and reputation in an electoral conflict» (with P. Villieu). Revue Française d'Économie, 34(3), 55-81, 2019.
In this article published in the Revue Française d'Économie in 2019, the authors look at the question: «Why don't politicians solve social problems?» One reason may be that these problems are difficult to solve, or that politicians are incompetent. But there is another reason: in a representative democracy, competent politicians may have an incentive not to solve problems in order to retain an electoral advantage. Standard models of career concerns show that reputational strengths can, to a certain extent, encourage politicians to solve problems. But if politicians' careers also depend on the residual problems they are able to solve competently, the reforms they implement will result from the trade-off between reputation and the need to keep enemies alive. In addition, politicians will be led to give priority to solving problems for which they are less qualified, in order to destroy the comparative advantage of their opponents.
- «Economics of conflict: history, methodology and research issues» (with P. Sekeris and A. Pietri). Revue Française d'Economie, 34(3), 3-21, 2019.
Before establishing itself as a the scope of economic analysis Although it became a fully-fledged concept in the early 1990s, conflict has long remained a mere parameter in economic models. This article proposes to look back at some of the major works of the 20th century which led to the emergence of the’economic analysis of conflict, as well as current research issues.
